The concept of fluid sovereignty denotes configurations of state authority in which flows of living and non-living things, within and across borders, render insecure claims of unconditional territorial control. Loss of monopoly control of the means of violence within a territory conventionally signals weak political sovereignty. Bordering Israel (including the occupied Golan Heights) and Syria, the Hasbani Basin, southern Lebanon, seems to exemplify such sovereign failings: over decades, rival security providers have provoked political instability and conflict in the region. However, fluid sovereignty brings to the fore state-nature relations neglected in scholarship on "fragile" or "failing" states. Informed by geographical work on hybrid sovereignties and vital materialism, we show how sovereign claims over the Hasbani Basin extend to (sub)terranean water sources and rainfall-dependent agricultural lands, both of which are deeply securitized. Incomplete centralization and territorialization by Lebanon of the Hasbani Basin evinces fractured state nature-the inability of the state to realize volumetric control of, and authority over, basin waters. This state nature is coproduced by the fluid materiality of the waters themselves, whose hydroclimatic circulation and contingencies are at odds with territorial designs for volumetric control. For rural communities in the Hasbani Basin economically dependent on access to agricultural water, field research reveals a practical experience of fluid sovereignty, both in adapting to water variability and also navigating use of agricultural borderlands subject to conflict-related dangers. Recent conflict spillovers from the Syrian war have reinforced, for the majority Druze population, the low legitimacy of Lebanese state nature. 
Introduction
Political instability and violent conflict are routine markers for contested or collapsing state authority in the post-Cold War world, especially in those dangerous, unruly spaces judged by the West to threaten national and international security. Whether "fragile," "failing," or "failed," the absence of effective sovereignty is often equated with the dispersal of control of the means of violence amongst rival security providers (Zartman 1995; Rotberg 2004; von Trotha 2005) ; and despite critical objections, including from geographers, to a causal inference that bypasses wider geopolitical and geo-economic drivers (Sidaway 2003; Elden 2009; Jeffrey 2009; Fregonese 2012; Grimm, Lemay-Hébert, and Nay 2014) , the global policy currency of fragile statehood is bolstered by Western cartographies of conflict in which weak governments are disabled or overrun by other wielders of armed force.
Bordering Israel (including the occupied Golan Heights) and Syria, the Hasbani Basin, southern Lebanon (Figure 1 ), has long witnessed political instability and armed conflict. Over decades, (para)military actors have undermined Lebanese territorial sovereignty and fueled ethno-religious tensions. In the 1970s the presence in southern Lebanon of the Palestine Liberation Organization, engaged in violent exchanges with Maronite Christians and Israel, triggered a civil war that unleashed sectarian antagonisms and rival interventions by external powers. Israeli invasions in 1978 and 1982, followed by occupation of the south, fuelled a Shi'a-led resistance which, with Iranian and Syrian support, evolved into Hizbullah (Abboud and Muller 2012, 29-34; Avon and Khatchadourian 2012, 23-33) . The majority Druze population in the Hasbani Basin, politically marginalized at the national level, presently coexists pragmatically, if uneasily, with Hizbullah and its Shi'a supporters. At the time of the 2005 "Cedar Revolution" leading Druze politicians (notably Walid Jumblatt) were part of a national coalition opposing Hizbullah and Syrian interference in Lebanon (Norton 2007, 126) , but more recently a perceived escalating threat posed both by Israel and Syrian-based Islamist militants has created shared security concerns. In the Hasbani Basin current instability is most obvious in the tense stand-off between Hizbullah and the Israeli military, which marks out a dynamic zone of insecurity across, and beyond, a United Nations-demarcated Blue Line. 1 Monitored by the United Nations
Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), the Hasbani borderlands include both signposted sites of high risk (e.g. minefields) and less visible, but still pervasive, spaces of danger (e.g. shifting "no-go" areas).
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The theoretical concern of this article is with state-nature relations neglected in scholarship on fragile states. Informed by work on hybrid sovereignties and vital materialism, we show how sovereign claims over the Hasbani Basin extend to (sub)terranean water sources and rainfall-dependent agricultural land, both of which are deeply securitized. Incomplete centralization and territorialization by Lebanon of the Hasbani basin evinces a fractured state nature-the inability of the state to assert volumetric control of, and authority over, basin waters. This state nature (Whitehead, Jones, and Jones 2007 ) is abstracted from, but co-produced by, the fluid materiality of the waters themselves, whose hydro-climatic circulation and 6 contingencies are at odds with territorial designs for volumetric control. To capture the onto-political dynamic here, we label as fluid sovereignty those configurations of state authority in which flows of living and non-living things, within and across borders, render insecure claims to unconditional territorial rule.
The materiality of, in the Hasbani case, contested hydrological volumes and flows cannot be separated from the experience of water-and weather worlds with their own turbulent rhythms (Ingold 2015, 69-72; Steinberg and Peters 2015, 256) .
Geographical research on conflict-affected borderlands is increasingly attuned to the everyday experiences and practices of those encountering fractured projections of sovereignty (Alatout 2009; Doevenspeck 2011; Korf and Raeymaekers 2013) .
Regional field research conducted in 2013 and 2014-comprising a purposive survey of 294 farming households, a focus group in Hasbaya and follow-up interviews-centered on agricultural communities in the basin. 2 The empirical interest in farming communities is justified by the fact that up to 70 per cent of the regional population works in agriculture and also that this is a water-dependent sector sensitive to hydro-political instability and hydro-climatic changes, including projected dryer and warmer conditions as a consequence of climate change (Farajalla et al. 2014) .The field research examined the affective conditions of fluid sovereignty; that is, how farming households experiencing an unstable environment practically cope with uncertain access to agricultural water.
In the next section, the theoretical contours of fluid sovereignty are first set out with reference to hybrid models of sovereignty, highlighting their application to southern access to agricultural water. In the conclusion we consider whether fluid sovereignty is arguably no more than a heightened condition of the very distributive system of sovereignty itself, where material and symbolic flows may escape projections of volumetric authority.
Fluid sovereignty
Fluid sovereignty thus denotes state-nature relations in which flows of living and nonliving things unsettle territorialized systems of state power. we follow here the account of Whitehead, Jones, and Jones (2007, 14-15) that modern statehood features the extraction and use of natural (material) forms to exercise political power.
This "framing" of the natural world is seen to operate through acts of centralization and territorialization: centralization entails the generation of standardized knowledge about nature that creates a field of state power over particular facets of nature; while territorialization involves the use of spatial metrics and geopolitical strategies to control and regulate nature. However extensive these processes, the production of state nature is beset by material overflows which elude and thereby limit acts of sovereign authority (Whitehead, Jones, and Jones 2007, 15-16; Cunningham 2012);  thus, transboundary water flows give biophysical permeability to geopolitical borders, circumscribing efforts by states to assert permanent sovereignty over hydrological resources.
What warrants fluid sovereignty as a descriptor of the Hasbani watershed is that the Lebanese state, in the presence of competing power-wielders, has not secured a monopoly on effective centralization and territorialization of basin waters. While the bulk of the Hasbani River is on Lebanese territory, its downstream contribution to the upper Jordan River is a source of disputed volumetric control with Israel-one of a number of flashpoints over water allocation in the wider Jordan Basin (Feitelson and Fischhendler 2009; Messerschmid and Selby 2015) . The inability of Lebanon effectively to uphold sovereign claims over what is seen as a national water resource, frustrated in its plans to extract more water from the Hasbani River, attests to a sharp asymmetry over control of its flow regime. Zeitoun et al. capture neatly the relevant power relation with their notion of "remote control" whereby Israel is able to exert a governing influence over the Hasbani without direct physical control of the territory through which it runs (2013). However, while Zeitoun et al. view this as a "decoupling of territory and water" (2013, 101), we argue below that it expresses fluid relations of sovereignty. Lebanon's territorial deficit over the Hasbani Basin can be gauged in political geographic terms as a shortfall in geopower-"the statecraft and technologies of power that make territory and the biosphere accessible, legitimate, knowable, useable" (Parenti 2015 , 835: see also Elden 2013 .
Recent discussion in critical political geography on state-nature relations has acknowledged the material embeddedness of territorial practices (Clark 2013; Depledge 2015; Grundy-Warr, Sithirith, and Li 2015; Ioris 2015; Steinberg and Peters 2015) . Extending volumetric understandings of territory-as a bundle of political technologies for projecting power over land and terrain (Elden 2013, 36) (Dionigi 2014, 107-109; Khatib 2014, 116-17 Agamben (1998, 64) , occupies the charged borderlands of sovereign power. The "multiple partially sovereign actors" (Ramadan 2005, 158) This mirrors Western self-conceptions of political sovereignty founded on a concept of human responsibility in which forms of nonhuman life are made mute (Derrida 2009, 116-20) . Critically interrogating this anthropocentric stance, and the wider nature/culture oppositions sustaining it, leads Derrida to propose the idea of divisible sovereignty: "the question is not that of sovereignty or nonsovereignty but that of the modalities of transfer and division of sovereignty said to be indivisible-said and supposed to be indivisible but always divisible" (2009, 291) .
Fluid sovereignty is one such modality of divisible sovereignty, not only signifying multiple wielders of (geo)power within a territory, but signaling also Derrida's ontological claim that the human exceptionalism of political sovereignty unravels amidst the porous boundaries between the human and nonhuman. The anthropocentric (Hobbesian) fiction is of the sovereign state as instituted solely through human control and convention, outside that which is natural (Derrida 2009, 42 ). Yet at the same time representations of political sovereignty are, Derrida claims, often suffused by figures of human animality or bestiality, such as contemporary references to the savagery of "rogue states" (2009, (19) (20) . As Whitehead, Jones, and Jones note, "in order to frame nature the state itself must become involved with, and entangled in, a range of objects, devices and things" (2007, 54) . In the section of the article on hydro-climatic flows and sovereignty, we draw on germane work from environmental geography on so-called "vital" or "immanent" materialism (e.g. Bingham and Hinchcliffe 2008; Braun 2008; Clark 2010; Lorimer 2012 ), scholarship reflecting, and feeding, a more general rise of geophilosophy in the social sciences and humanities (Bennett 2010; Clark 2011; Woodward 2013; Ingold 2015) . Vital materialism posits a nonhuman nature actively assembling with, and independently affecting, the discursive and material practices of humans in emergent groupings of matter-energy. With their topological unity, watersheds are a palpable expression of such an assemblage, as the "natural" water flows within a physical catchment become reconstituted by the co-mingling of human and non-human elements.
Treating the ocean as a spatial trope for reimagining geographical work on territory as volume, Steinberg and Peters (2015) coin the term "wet ontology" to capture the dynamic, more-than-human materiality of geographical moves to secure volume.
This materiality is seen as inseparable from experiences of place and affective relations (2015, 256) . In examining below water-related vulnerabilities of farming households in the Hasbani Basin, we consider the lived experience of fluid sovereignty as registered by those with a livelihood dependence on secure access to agricultural water. The co-production of fluid sovereignty by unstable hydro-political and hydro-climatic flows is received as a threat to livelihoods, prompting from farmers a range of coping practices. Revealed are mutual and affective relations that respond autonomously to a precarious hydrosphere, challenging the legitimacy of a Lebanese state unable to exert volumetric control over basin waters. We turn now to Lebanese state framings of the Hasbani Basin, which bear a divisible sovereignty imprint of stalled and interrupted processes of post-colonial state formation.
State nature(s)
Lebanese efforts to centralize and territorialize Hasbani water resources as state nature have faltered in the face of cross-border pressures from a stronger neighbouring sovereign, but also reveal long-standing domestic failings to exercise epistemic and political authority over the water yield of the Hasbani River. The (million cubic meters) (Zeitoun et al. 2012, 42; UN-ESCWA and BGR 2013, 181) .
Across the whole basin, abstractions from both river and groundwater sources are estimated at no more than 8 MCM/year (Zeitoun et al. 2012, 51) . The lack of authoritative data on precipitation, infiltration and aquifer recharge creates uncertainty over precise "natural" groundwater flows; yet substantial groundwater fluxes from southern Lebanon into Israel demonstrate a major hydrological obstacle to greater physical control by Lebanon of Hasbani waters.
At the southern end of the Hasbani River, gravity-led transfers into Israel are precisely monitored by a series of flow gauges, for Israel's greater epistemic authority over transboundary water balances, driven by a state security imperative of hydro-political control, supports a status quo of sovereign entitlement according to established prior use. As noted above, this is accurately labeled as "remote control" (Zeitoun et al. 2013) in the sense that ongoing water use is maintained without direct physical control over the hydrological terrain from which that water issues. We claim, there is a bilateral grouping or co-constitution of the human and more-than-human (Latour 2004; Bennett 2010 ) and also, more radically, the speculative realist thesis positing a spatio-temporal asymmetry of earth processes vis-à-vis human becoming-"that we might need to think of the entire zone of human-nonhuman interchange as itself nothing more than a concrete, localized and contingent region in the midst of an overwhelming inhuman expanse" (Clark 2011, 48-49) . From the latter position, anthropogenic climate change finds a geological analogue, the midPliocene (3.3 to 3 Ma), which is far outside the moral-practical compass of political sovereignty yet must somehow still be registered in terms of human choices (Clark 2010, 49) . Sensitizing sovereignty to the deep temporality of geological terrain expresses Derrida's claim that political sovereignty has more than one ground, more than one solidity (2009, 34) . The focus in this section is on the political effects of the Hasbani Basin as a hydro-climatic assemblage, notably the volatility and unpredictability of "natural" water transfers to agriculture.
The Hasbani River has a surface catchment area of 698km 2 groundwater discharges (Rimmer and Salingar 2006, 526; Zeitoun et al. 2012, 45) .
The material agency of the river itself is of course still more expansive and dynamic, continuously breaking down and remaking itself through multiple assemblages of inorganic and organic objects. Current "natural" flows are not substantially altered in quantity by direct human impacts, though there are significant qualitative changes as a result of untreated water discharges and runoff contamination from pesticides and chemical fertilizers (Badr, Holail, and Olama 2014) . Nevertheless, hydro-climatic changes are recognized as a major challenge to agricultural livelihood options. 88 per cent of the farmers surveyed in the Hasbani basin stated that climate change reduced water availability for agriculture, above all by higher crop water requirements due to rising temperatures. The multi-crop cultivation model followed by most farming households in the region has traditionally favored fruit crops-cherries, apples, grapevine-which are sensitive to high winter temperatures (Ministry of Environment 2011, 96-98 ). Yet across a predominantly Druze farming population, unforeseen climatic events tend to be received with equanimity: "everything is from God-what comes from nature we cope with".
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Highly germane in this respect is that Jebal El Sheikh (Mount Hermon), a source of the Hasbani River, has deep religious meaning for the Druze as the site of the transfiguration of Christ-one of their major prophets.
Affective conditions of fluid sovereignty
Fluid sovereignty, as a form of divisible sovereignty, suggests openness to how projections of state nature shape, and are received by, political subjects, although
Derrida ignores the practical conditions of sovereignty encountered in everyday life.
In their discussion of state-nature relations, Whitehead, Jones, and Jones (2007) similarly underplay the lived experience of those affected by national projects of centralization and territorialization. The Indeed, the avoidance or abandonment of lands deemed unsafe was, for both survey respondents and focus group participants, the primary means of defensive coping in the face of differential water availability across a risky landscape. Different spatiotemporal configurations of (para)military violence-including the proximity of mines, cluster munitions, and the fire-range of IDF border positions-are grasped through lived experience, generating a practical geography of precarious terrain; for example, the gradation of dangerous lands according to whether mine clearance did not take place (ard khatera), or still in doubt that clearance was completed (ard mushakkaka), or uncertain whether it was done at all (ard mumken mullaghama). Not surprisingly, physical damage to farming assets from outside military interference (tadakhol)
significantly reduces the propensity of farmers to adopt coping practices that signal a long-term commitment to the land (e.g. greenhouse cultivation, irrigation). Economic losses resulting from responses to IDF cross-border actions (e.g. land abandonment
or neglect from fear of bodily harm) also hinder the adoption of coping practices, though to a lesser extent than direct damage to agricultural assets. An improved 
